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BRANDENBURG tJ. PAC. GAS & ELEc. Co.

[28 C.2d·.

[Sac. No. 6777. In Bank. May 81, 1946.]

LlLI.AN BR.ANDENBURG, as Administratrix, etc., Appellant, v. PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY
(a Corporation) et a1.. Respondents.
(1) Judgments - Judgment Non Obstante Veredicto. - A motion
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict of a jury may properly be granted only if it appears from the evidence, viewed
in the light most favorable to the party securing the verdict,
that there is no substantial evidence to support the verdict.
(2] Street Railways - Injuries From Operation - Degree of Care
Required.-The standard of care required from a streetcar
company and its employees with regard to the dangers from
a turning car is not absolute but depends on the surrounding
oircumstances. Their conduct must be viewed as a whole
in the light of all circumstances from which negligence might
be inferred, and the standard of oare to be exercised must be
commensurate to the dangers of the business and the hazards
at the place of the injury.
[3) Negligence-Exercise of Care-Knowledge of Danger. - A deoisive oonsideration in determining whether an aot was negligent is whether the surrounding circumstances made it reasonably foreseeable that there was a risk of injury. When this
question depends on the foresight of another it becomes pertinent whether the other had reason to perceive danger, and
whether alertness to the requirements of tht> situation could
be expected of him.
(4) Street Railways - Rounding Curves - Injuries from Overhang.-Where it should havt> been apparent to a streetcar
company and its employees that persons alighting from its
car in a safety zone would relax their vigilance and could
reasonably be expected to divert their minds from the dangerS-" ...
of the str~et traffic, they should have been warned that the
car, whioh had stopped near a curve of the track, was going
to turn and that its rear end would protrude into the safety
zone, even though such zone was maintained by the city and
not by the oarrier. It was not only the duty of the motorman
to give such warning when hE' stnrt.ed the car after the stop,
[1] See 14 Cal.Jur. 980; 30 Am.Jur. 844.
[3] See 19 Cal.Jur. 583; 38 Am.Jur. 665.
Mclt. Dig. References: [1] Judgmcllt.<. § 113(1); [2] Street
Railways. § 49; [3] Negligence, § 25; [4] Street Railways, § 61 ;
[6] Street Railways, § 78.
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but also the duty of the company to instruct the motorman
to give such warning.
[5] Id. - Contributory Negligence-Near Tracks.-A person who
was struck by the rear end of a turning streetcar after he had
alighted therefrom in a safety zone was not contributively
negligent where he had DO reason to believe that the zone
would be within the area of the overswin/!:.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Sacramento County. Peter J. Shields, Judge. Reversed
with directions.
Action for damages for personal injuries sustained when
struck by a streetcal'. Judgment for defendant, notwithstanding verdict for plaintiff, reversed with directions.
Brandenburger & White and W. A. White for Appellant.
Thos. J. Straub, F. H. Pearson and Jay L. Henry for
Respondents.
Huntington P. Bledsoe and Donahue, Richards & Hamlin as Amici Curiae on behalf of Respondents.
TRAYNOR, J.-On June 11, 1943, plaintiff, his wife, and
three small children boarded a streetcar of defendant corporation travelling north on 28th Street in Sacramento. The car
was operated by one man, defendant Colwell. When the car
approached P Street, plaintiff signalled the motorman to stop.
At the corner of 28th and P Streets, adjacent to the track
on 28th Street, there was a safety zone approximately 4 feet
wide and 44 feet long outlined on the pavement by broad white
stripes and marked at the corners with white buttons. Plaintiff and his family alighted from the front door of the car to
the safety zone. After the stop, the car turned to the west
around a curve to P Street. .As the car turned, the rear end
overlapped the safety zone about two feet. The motorman
was aware of the overlap but did not warn plaintiff that the
car was going to turn west on P Street or call plaintiff's
attention to the danger from the overlap. Plaintiff knew that
there were curved tracks at that corner and that the car
might therefore turn, but he did not "know definitely that it
would turn." He testified that had he known the car was going
to turn west on P Street, he would have remained on the car
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until it reached 27th Street, because he would then have been
one block nearer his destination. While standing in the safety
zone, plaintiff was struck by the rear end of the car and
seriously injured. He testified that he was struck three or
four seconds after he alighted. He described the incident as
follows: "Well, I stepped into the safety zone and while doing
this I was observing the welfare of my family. 1 was looking
after them. . • • I was motioning to them to stay in the clear
and not to run out in the street, stay in the safety zone, and
as I was turning to the left the back right side of the streetcar
struck me or collided me striking me to the sidewalk." The
jury returned a verdict for damages in the sum of $2,500.
The trial court gave judgment for defendants notwithstanding
the verdict. Plaintiff appealed. He died during the pendency
of the appeal, and the administratrix of his estate was sub·
stituted as plaintiff. In this opinion. however. thf' decedent
will be referred to as plaintiff.
[1] A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict of
a jury may properly be granted only if it appears from the
evidence. viewed in the light most favorable to the party
securing the verdict, that there is no substantial evidence to
support the verdict. If there is any substantial evidence, or
reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, in support of
the verdict, the motion should be denied. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 629: Neel v. Jlannings, Inc., 19 Ca1.2d 647. 649 [122 P.2d
576]; Oard v. Bome, 210 Cal. 200 [291 P. 190]; :McKellar v.
Pendergast, 68 Ca1.App.2d 485, 487 [156 P.2d 950).) There
was ample evidence in the present case to support the verdict.
It is contended that plaintiff had a right to feel secure
from any collision with a streetcar whi1e he was standing in
the safety zone and that he was at least entitled to a warning
that the car would protrude into the safety zone. Defendants
__ take _the position that since the traffic department of the city
of Sacramento estal)lished the safety zone it was the city's
responsibility if the zone was not so located that its users
would be reasonably safe within the zone. They contend that
streetcars are not required to keep clear of a safety zone, since
section 572 of the Vehicle Code forbids the driving only of
"vehicles," a term that does not include streetcars (§ 31).
through or within a safety zone. Relying on Dwyer v. Los
Angeles Ry. Oorp., 115 Cal.App. 709, 714 [2 P.2d 468], thily
contend that the fact that in rounding a curve the rear end
of a streetcar will swing beyond the track is so well known
to every adult person that the motorman of a streetcar is
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under no legal duty to warn such a person of the possible
danger of a collision from the swing of the car.
The streetcar tracks in question were laid before the safety
zone was established by the city. It does not appear therefore
that defendant corporation was responsible for the failure of
the ~afety zone to afford protection to its users against the
dangers of streetcar traffic. ~or does the present case turn on
the question whether the motorman of a streetcar that is about
to turn on a curve is generally under a duty to warn an adult
person within the area covered by the swing of the car. The
controlling question is whether such a warning is required
when the person who might be struck by the rear end of t.he
car stands in a safety zone.
[2J The standard of care required from a streetcar company and its employees with regard to the dangers from a
turning car is not absolute but depends upon the surrollnding
circumstances. Their conduct must be viewed as a whole in
the light of all circumstances from which negligence might be
inferred. especially "where the several elements from which
negligence might be inferred are so closely interwovan as to
form a single pattern, and where each imparts character to the
others." (Blair v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 323 U.S. 600.
604 [64 S.Ot. 545, 89 L.Ed. 490].) If their conduct is so
judged a precaution necessary under some circum..c;tances may
be unnecessary under others. In any event the standard of
care to be exercised must be commensurate to the dangers of
thE' business and the .hazard.c; at the place of the injury. (Peri
v. Los Angeles ·'unction By. Co., 22 Oa1.2d 111, 123 [137
P.2d 441], and cases there cited; Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line
R. Co., 323 U.S. 574, 579 [65 S.Ot. 421, 89 L.Ed. 465]: Blair
v. Baltim01'e & Ohio R. Co., supra, at 605.) [3J A decisive
consideration in determining whether an act was negligent is
whet.her the surrounding circumstances made it reasonably
forseen hIe that there was a risk of injury. When this question
depends on the foresight of another it becomeR pertinent
whether the other had reason to perceive danger, and whether
fl ]crtness to the requirement~ of the situation could be expected of him. Thus an actor's duties vary according to
whether he fa(,es a child or an adnlt. a blind man or one who
('an see. one who sleeps or one who is awake. His duties also
vary according to whether he may reasonably expect another
to be a,vare of danger or must know that another's sense of
security has been relaxed. (See, Rest., Torts, §§ 290, 302;
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Prosser, Torts, 243.) [4] In the present case it ~ould have
been apparent to defendants that users of the safety zone
would relax their vigilance. A safety zone is ordinarily an
assurance to those within its limits that they are reasonably
safe from danger. Even though defendants had no part in
establishing the safety zone in an unsafe place, it should have
been apparent to them that the users of the safety zone would
act differently from ordinary users of the street. Regardless
of whether one who stood in plaintiff's place had there been
no safety zone would be entitled to a warning (see Dwyer
v. Los Angeles Ry. Corp., 115 Cal.App. 709, 714 [2 P.2d 468] ;
Wood v. Los Angeles Ry. Co., 172 Cal. 15 [155 P. 68]; Zalewski v. Milwaukee etc. Co., 219 Wis. 541, 545 [263 N;W.
577]; Trail v. Tulsa Street Ry. Co., 97 Okla. 19 [222 P. 950];
see, also, Ann.Cas. 1916E 680) plaintiff, who stood in such a
zone could reasonably be expected to divert his mind from
the dangers of the street traffic, and should therefore have been
warned that he was in danger of harm from the overswing of
the car. "Conceding that a pedestrian must be presumed to
take notice of the obvious fact that the body of a streetcar in
rounding a curve must necessarily swing out some little distance from the track on the outside of the curve, plaintiff
herein had no reason to believe that the markings of the
safety zone would be within the area of the overswing." He
had, therefore, the "right to rely upon the appearances."
(Mangan v. Des Moines City Ry. Co., 200 Iowa 597 [203 N.W.
705, 41 A.L.R. 368J; see, also, Laurent v. United Railways
(Mo.), 191 S.W. 992; Elder v. Rutledge, 217 Ind. 459, 469,
470 [27 N.E.2d 358]; Heva v. City of Seattle, 150 Wash.
61 [272 P. 41J; Wilson v. In.ternational Ry. Co., 205 App.Div.
275 [199 N.Y.S. 562]; Wechsler v. Pittsburgh Rys. Co., 247
Pa. 96, 98 [93 A. 19] ;1 contra: Ferguson v. Kansas City Public
Service Co., 159 Kan. 520 [156 P.2d 869, 875]; cf. Hering v.
City of Detroit, 244 Mich. 293, 295 [221 N.W. 278] [zone
unmarked but provided by city ordinance to exist at every
regular stopping place of streetcars].) It makes no difference
that in the Mangan case the defendant company had installed
the safety zone, for the appearances on which plaintiff could
rely were the same in both cases. Nor can it be said that
because the Vehicle Code prohibits only the driving of vehicles,
not including streetcars, through safety zones, the users of
such zones are not justified in assuming that the zone affords
protection from the dangers of streetcar traffic as well as
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from the dangers of other traffic. It is generally understood
that it is the purpose of a safety zone to afford its users protection from all traffic hazards. In harmony with this common
conception, section 88 of the Vehicle Code defines a safety
zone as an "area or space lawfully set apart within a roadway
for the exclusive use of pedestrians." The Vehicle Code dire('tl'
its prohibition against passing through safety zones to vehicles only because it presupposes that safety zones will be
so arranged as to be out of the rell('h of Rtreetcars operated
on stationary tracks
Since plaintiff's right to a warning follows from his use of
a safety zone and is a right enjoyed by any member of the
public similarly situated, it is unnecessary to determine
whether plaintiff, while standing in the safety zone, was still
a passenger within the meaning of section 2100 of the Civil
Code. (See Lagoma1'sino v. Market St. By. 00., 69 Cal.App.2d
388,393 [158 P.2d 982]; Ohoquette v. Key System Transit 00.,
118 Cal.App. 643, 652 [5 P.2d 921].) Since the risk that
materialized in this case was a general one and was necessarily connected with the location of the safety zone and
the curve of the tracks at that corner, it was not only the
duty of the defendant motorman to warn plaintiff when he
started the car but also the duty of the defendant corporation
to instruct its motorman to give such a warning. The former
is therefore liable not only for the negligence of its employees but also for its own negligence.
[5J That plaintiff was not contributively negligent follows
from our conclusion that he had no reason to believe that the
safety zone would be within the area of the overswing. "Contributory negligence is not imputable to a plaintiff for failing to look out for· a dangerwhich be__ 1!lld__no :reasonable
cause to apprehend,1 or to a plaintiff who was deceived by
appearances calculated to deceive an ordinarily prudent person." (Welsh v. Mercy Hospital, 65 Cal.App.2d 473, 479 [151
P.2d 17]; see 38 Am.Jur. 866.)
The judgment notwithstanding the verdict is reversed and
the court is directed to enter judgment in accordance with
the verdict of the jury.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Schauer,

J., and Spence, J., concurred.

